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Article 10

JUDICIAL

SAFEGUARDS OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS

I. Introduction
With the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ.,' the United States Supreme
Court began what realistically may be called the era of decisions for protection
of the rights of underprivileged groups. The Brown. ruling dealt with rights
in the basic social structure of our federal community, and it opened the way
for what seems to be an endless line of rulings involving the rights of individuals
in particular facets of our way of life from privacy to public accommodations.
While not specifically dealing with indigent persons, Brown can be looked to
as the bedrock decision in the topic area of this writing - the rights of the indigent in a criminal proceeding.2 Since the ignorant are those who inevitably
cannot rise above the status of indigence, the guarantee of equal and competent
education is one step in the direction of erasing the class of indigents and its
concurring burdens. If a man receives a suitable basic education he will either
be able, financially, to secure devices protective of his rights or at least be possessed of sufficient knowledge to ask for those protections which will be granted
to him at the expense of the government.
This note seeks to report the courts' answer to the query, what must the
government do to protect the rights of those who do not know enough to request
or who are otherwise unable to secure the same protections in a criminal law

enforcement proceeding as those available to the learned and those with sufficient finances? The cases discussed in this note -

all revealing acute judicial

concern for the rights of the indigent - enunciate the underlying rationale and
spirit which has been adopted by the contemporary legislation designed to
afford justice to the poor, to provide the financial and organizational structure
which insures that justice for the poor is an effective legal reality.

II. Rights of the Indigent Criminal Defendant in Situations
before the Formal Trial
The initial encounter of an individual with the criminal law process occurs
when he is "picked up for questioning." It is this situation which serves as the
formative process in a prospective prosecution, since statements made at this time
may in effect be determinative of the defendant's fate. For this reason the
Supreme Court of the United States decided, in Escobedo v. Illinois,' that, when
the police investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unresolved crime
and becomes an inquiry which focuses on a particular suspect who has been
taken into custody, such suspect has a right to the assistance of counsel.4 The
denial of this right was held to be violative of the sixth amendment to the United
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 More specifically the emphasis will be on the cases decided since 1960, since these decisions represent the finished product of the building-block decisions of prior years.

3

378 U.S. 478 (1964).

4 Id. at 490. This has been held to apply to matters such as traffic violation investigations. Tacoma v. Heater, 409 P.2d 867 (Wash. 1966) (drunken driving charge).
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States Constitution as made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment.' The decision makers in Escobedo observed that incriminating statements
might be elicited under circumstances similar to the fact situation before them
and that these statements could effectively determine the outcome of the trial
itself. The Court was aware that the right to counsel at the formal trial' would
be for naught if the defendant had been convicted -in effect - by the procedures before trial.7
The remedy for the situation encountered in Escobedo is to hold inadnissible any statement made by a person who has been denied the assistance
of counsel at this phase of the proceedings, without inquiry into the voluntariness'
of the statement.' This is the same attitude the Court has taken when faced
with confession situations in which there has been no physical coercion, but
rather such mental pressures as to cast doubt on the reliability of any statements
made by the accused. In these matters the surrounding circumstances so taint
the statement that the Court has decreed that there should be wholesale inadmissibility, on the theory that the suspect's mind was overborne by the activity.9
Escobedo indeed settles the question of whether the right to counsel exists
at the interrogation stage. However, an important matter not given explicit
treatment in the Court's opinion is whether a person must be advised of his
right to counsel or must request assistance before it can be determined that
there has been a denial of the right or a competent waiver. Mr. Justice White,
in dissent, assumes that the majority implicitly decided that no request was
needed." At present both state and lower federal courts are embroiled in controversy on this question. A majority of the cases on this point hold either that
advice as to the right to counsel is not required, or that a request for counsel
is necessary, the decisions being based on the rationale that the rule is strictly
5 Id. at 490-91.
6 The right to counsel at trial'is granted by the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), treated infra.
7 378 U.S. at 487. The Court cites as part of its reasoning a statement in a dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957): "The right to use counsel
at the formal trial is a very hollow thing when, for all practical purposes, the conviction is
already assured by a pretrial examination." 352 U.S. at 344.
8 378 U.S. at 490-91. However, it has been held that the Escobedo rule does not apply
in situations other than those involving statements secured during the period of police interrogations in the absence of counsel. Stovall v. Denno, 34 U.S.L. WnaK 2423 (2d Cir. Jan. 31,
1966) (no right to counsel during identifications of the suspect); People v. Graves, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114 (1966) (no right to counsel during taking of handwriting exemplars
of the suspect).
9 E.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (woman told that if she did not "cooperate" she would be deprived of her children and of state financial aid); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962) (fourteen-year-old held for five
days without seeing his parents, a lawyer or a friendly adult who could have informed him of
his rights and could have helped him to'seek them so as to equalize his footing with his questioners); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), (illiterate defendant who was susceptible to intimidation was questioned intermittently for five days without the benefit of
counsel); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (mentally retarded defendant held incommunicado from family and friends and without adequate food).
10 At the very outset Mr. Justice White states that,
although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this case, it would be
naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether
the accused has retained his own counsel, . . . or has asked to consult with counsel
in the course of interrogation.
378 U.S. at 495.
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limited to the factual situation in Escobedo." In that case the defendant had
retained counsel, and there were requests by both the suspect and his attorney
that they be allowed to confer. In the case of McQueen v. Maxwell, 2 the court
went so far as to decree that application for the assistance of counsel must be
made to a court and that an appeal to the police officers does not suffice to
invoke the Escobedo rule. Such a holding destroys any functional value of
Escobedo. The police may interrogate the "suspect" without counsel until he
is able to get to court. Thus, the defendant is in effect in the same situation as
he was before Escobedo, i.e., without counsel in the important preliminary
stages.
On the other side of the argument are those cases which hold either that
advice as to the right is necessary or that a request is not necessary to the existence of the right to counsel in such situations."3 An illustration of the rationale
employed in these cases is found in People v. Dorado.4 The court in that case
demonstrated that in order to give proper effect to the Escobedo decision, the
focus should be on the underlying purposes of the ruling rather than on the
factual situation which gave rise to it. The opinion explains that the right is
for the protection of the ignorant as well as those learned enough to request
legal assistance:
We must recognize that the imposition of the requirement for the request
would discriminate against the defendant who does not know his rights.
The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who
most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and
by such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require the request would
be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously
prompted him to make it.' 5
Such a decision looks to the true import of Escobedo as a rule to benefit
all, not only those learned in the rules of criminal processes. Moreover, this
reasoning comports with the rationale underlying the exclusionary rule for
11 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 354 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1965); Jackson v. United
States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965); United States
ex rel. Townsend v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965);
Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Lokos v. State, 179 So. 2d 714 (Ala.
1965) ; State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721, cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 320 (1965);
Dampier v. State, 180 So. 2d 183 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965); People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.2d
375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684
(Iowa 1964); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966
'(1965); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.
2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965); McQueen v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 30, 201 N.E.2d 701
(1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Linde v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Browne
v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004, rehearing denied,
380 U.S. 959 (1965).
12 177 Ohio St. 30, 201 N.E.2d 701 (1964).
13 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965);
Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964); United States ex ref. Rivers v. Myers,
240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Galarza Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (D. P.R. 1964);
People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937, 946 (1965);
State v. Hall, 397 P.2d 261 (Idaho 1964) (concurring opinion); State v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557
(Ore. 1964); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965).
14 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937, 946 (1965).
15 Id. at 369-70.
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confessions obtained in, and as the result of, an atmosphere of substantial
coercion and inducement as announced in Haynes v. Washington The exclusionary rule is, according to the Haynes Court, a protection for those whose
minds may be overborne by the tactics of the police.' It does not take the interposition of much factual data to arrive at a realization that the persons whose
minds are more readily influenced are those "ignorant" of their rights and that
these people are most in need of the armor of the constitutional right to counsel.
Viewed in this light, a decision like McQueen appears to be an irrational stricture on Escobedo.
Although adherence to the facts in Escobedo may dictate the result obtained
in those cases which require a request for counsel, the case cannot be looked at
as isolated from the cases which have gone before it. If Escobedo is examined in
the light of decisions such as Carnley v. Cochran," and Massiah v. United
States," it becomes readily apparent that the decision in Dorado and lke cases
-that request for assistance by the accused is not necessary - is the proper
concept of the right to counsel at this stage of proceedings. In Carnley, the
Supreme Court reversed a Florida decision which had held that the right to
counsel had been waived because there was nothing in the record to indicate
that defendant had requested counsel. The Court stated: "[I]t is settled that
where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request."2 Massiah dealt with a federal
prosecution, and thus the applicability of the sixth amendment was the only
question involved. The Government attempted to use statements of the indicted
defendant taken secretly and in the absence of counsel. However, it was held
that such statements were inadmissible because taken in the absence of counsel
and that the right to counsel extends to interrogations away from the police
station.2 Thus the right was implicitly held to exist without request because
it is obvious that when a person is subject to secretive listening he cannot make
a request for counsel. If the right to counsel exists without request under the
sixth amendment, and if this same right is made obligatory on the states by the
fourteenth amendment (the constitutional requirement of Carnley), the compelling conclusion is that the right announced in Escobedo does not depend on
a request for its existence.
The next phase of the criminal proceeding at which there is a necessity
for protection of the accused is the arraignment. It was decided in the case of
Hamilton v. Alabama," that this was such a critical stage of the proceedings
in the Alabama system 2 that rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth
16

373 U.S. 503 (1963).

17 Id. at 513.

18 369 U.S. 506 (1962). This case was cited by Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Escobedo,
as authority for his statement quoted supra note 10.
19 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
20 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962). The Court in Escobedo said that the right to counsel at the
police interrogation is such a constitutional right, guaranteed by the sixth amendment and
made obligatory on the States by the fourteenth amendment. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
21 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). This reasoning has been followed by the states in decisions
such as People v. Halstrom, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2408 (Ill.
Jan. 25, 1966).
22 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
23 Under that system arraignment was the only time at which the defense of insanity might
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amendment are violated by a lack of counsel at this time. Again White v.
24
Maryland,
it was held that there was a violation of the fourteenth amendment
because defendant was not represented by counsel at a "preliminary hearing"
when he entered a plea of guilty which was later introduced at the trial. As a
further enforcement measure the Court decided that it was not necessary that
a showing of prejudice from the absence of counsel be made." These decisions
indicate a reconsideration and acceptance of the idea of Mr. Justice Black's
dissent in the case of In re Groban.2" The contention of that dissent was that
the right to the assistance of counsel at the trial itself would be a nullity if at
a time before trial the defendant has been placed in such a position, by the lack
of intelligent guidance, that the trial itself becomes a mere formality for conviction." As to whether or not the right arises only on request, fear that a
request requirement would deprive those who do not know enough to ask for
counsel of the assistance they need has resulted in the conclusion that request
is not necessary for the right to exist.2" This is a continuance of the recognition
that "equal protection" demands that these rights be extended to the ignorant
as well as the learned.
A third phase of pre-trial activity in which an indigent defendant is subject
to treatment differing from that accorded to a defendant with sufficient finances
is in the area of admittance to bail. As yet there has been no Supreme Court
decision holding that an indigent must be given the same right to pre-trial
freedom as he would have if he were able to meet the financial requirements
of bail. 9 The United States Constitution does not confer the right of release
on bail."0 The only requirement of the Constitution is that bail shall not be excessive." In Stack v. Boyle, 2 the Supreme Court decided that the purpose of bail
is to assure the presence of the defendant at the trial and that any figure set
for bail which is higher than the amount reasonably calculated for this purpose
is excessive. The feelings of some commentators is that, coupling the Stack case
be pleaded, or at which pleas in abatement or motions challenging the composition of the
grand jury might be made.
24 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
25 Id. at 60.
26 352 U.S. 330 (1957). See note 7 supra.
27 This was the state of affairs in Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28 (1962). The decision
of constitutional conviction by the state court was vacated and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Hamilton v. Alabama. In Walton, a defendant who was not represented by counsel
at the arraignment admitted the voluntariness of a confession which was later introduced at his
trial wherein he was ultimately convicted on the basis of the confession. On remand, 236 Ark.
439, 366 S.W.2d 707 (1963), the defendant was granted a new trial because of the reading of
the statement he had made at the arraignment.
28 E.g., Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 '(5th Cir. 1965). This case also decided that
the right applied in misdemeanor as well as felony prosecutions.
29 The importance of pre-trial freedom is evident from a consideration of some of the
detrimental effects of imprisonment at such a time. Mr. Justice Douglas, sitting as a Circuit
Justice in Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup.Ct. 197 (1960), points out in his denial of an application for the reduction of bail pending certiorari, the results of inability to meet bail because
of indigence, in addition to a denial of freedom, which are incurred by a defendant: "Imprisoned, a man may have no opportunity to investigate his case, to cooperate with his counsel,
to earn the money that is still necessary for the fullest use of his right to appeal." 81 Sup.Ct.
at 198.
30 Wagner v. United States, 250 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936,
rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 857 (1959).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

32

342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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with the reasoning in Griffin v. Illinois,"s (denial of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to fail to provide an indigent with a
record of trial proceedings for appeal purposes), it is but a short step to a decision that the fourteenth amendment would demand a release of an indigent
who cannot meet bail where there are other factors which would assure his
presence at the trial." In other words, it is arguable that if bail is set at a
figure which cannot be met by the indigent, and if his presence at the trial is
assured by any number of factors besides a monetary bond, the bail is excessive.
Without awaiting judicial directives to the effect that an indigent be
released prior to trial although he cannot meet the financial requirements for
bail, various projects 5 - both by statute and local agreement-have been
instituted which make such pre-trial release possible. On the statutory side,
exemplary of the measures undertaken are the recently enacted statutes in Illinois. The first of this series of legislation provides for release on recognizance
in the discretion of the court.36 The penalty for "bail-jumping" under this law
is the imposition of additional criminal liability. The express policy basis of
the statute is that pecuniary loss is not the sole effective means for compelling
appearance at trial after pre-trial release: "This Section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of relying upon criminal sanctions instead of
financial loss to assure the appearance of the accused."" In line with the general tenor of the above section, the Illinois legislature has enacted another statute
of benefit to indigents facing the problems of posting bail. Under this new section, release is allowed upon the deposit of 10% of the amount set for bail, and
when the defendant complies with the conditions of the bond, 90% of this
sum will be returned to him, with 10% being retained for administrative costs. 8
Such a statute requires the defendant in most cases, to secure a lesser amount
of money than would be necessary for payment of a full bail-bond premium
to a commercial bondsman. This section has created a predictable furor with
the Illinois bondsmen, and has led them to institute a taxpayers' suit to declare
33 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
34 E.g., Foote, Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 959, 1125 (1965).
In the federal system the financial resources of the defendant and his character are two matters
to be considered in determining the amount of bail. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c).
35 For a comprehensive study of the many alternatives to bail which are being used in
various parts of the United States and other countries, see GoLDFARn, RANSOM, A CRITIQUE
OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM

(1965).

36

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1964), provides in part:
When from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion that the accused
will appear as required either before or after conviction the accused may be released on his own recognizance. A failure to appear as required by such recognizance
shall constitute an offense subject to the penalty provided in Section 32-10 of the
"Criminal Code of 1961," . . . for violation of the bail bond, and any obligated sum
fixed in the recognizance shall be forfeited and collected....

37
38

Ibid.
The pertinent provisions of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Supp. 1965) are:
(a) The person for whom bail has been set shall execute the bail bond and
deposit with the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money equal
to 10% of the bail, but in no event shall such deposit be less than $25.
(f) When the conditions of the bail bond have been performed and the accused
has been discharged from all obligations in the cause the clerk of the court shall
return to the accused 90% of the sum which had been deposited and shall retain as
bail bond costs 10% of the amount deposited.
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the law unconstitutional. 3" While this system may not insure appearance by
the defendant, it will allow pre-trial release for many who would not otherwise
obtain this benefit. An additional incentive to appear under this system is that
a defendant knows that upon appearance he will receive a refund of a large
part of the security. Contrast this with the situation of a defendant dealing
with a bail bondsman; he will have none of the premium returned to him even
if he appears.4"
Perhaps the best known example of the non-statutory projects for the
pre-trial release of indigents is the Manhattan Bail Project carried out under
the auspices of the Vera Foundation. This system is based on the theory that
investigation may reveal other factors which are sufficient deterrants to flight
so as to dispense with the necessity of imposing financial requirements for bail.4
Under this plan defendants are interviewed, and their statements are taken and
checked for accuracy. On the basis of these interviews and statements, recommendations are made to the court by the Foundation workers (full-time law
students) as to whether an individual is a good release risk. It then remains
for the court to determine if the defendant will be released on his own recognizance. If released, the Foundation keeps in touch with each person and
reminds him of his time to appear. During its first three years of operation of
the Manhattan Project, 98.5% of the defendants released have appeared at
the scheduled time. Of the persons released under regular bail procedures during
the same period, almost three times as many failed to present themselves.4 2
Such statistics are a testimony to the efficacy of this type of system. Until there
is a judicial decree as to whether an indigent must be admitted to bail as he
would be if he had sufficient finances, the only hope of combatting the harmful
effects of pre-trial incarceration rests in local adoption of such devices as the
Illinois statutes and the Manhattan Project, which have proved that the fear of
forfeiting a large sum of money is not the only adequate means of assuring that
a released defendant will appear at trial.

39 The arguments of the bondsmen were that the state was soliciting bond business at a
loss to taxpayers, the state was placed in a preferred position over free enterprise and that the
possibility of the state keeping only 10% in case of forfeiture, as oposed to 100% in situations
with a bondsman, created a false sense of security in the taxpayers who would believe that the
revenue from forfeited bonds would amount to 100% of the amount of the bonds. This last
argument is questionable in light of the fact that there is no requirement that the state collect
only the 10% deposit upon forfeiture. GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 35, at 201-02.
40 GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 35, at 201-03. In substance this bill was introduced
in the U.S. Senate during the second session of the 88th Congress. Important in both the
Illinois passage and the presentment to Congress was the idea that such a statute not only
permits pre-trial freedom for the indigent, but it may also serve to release the stranglehold
exercised by commercial bondsmen in determining who is to be freed on bail.
41 Mr. Justice Douglas sitting as a circuit justice in Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup.Ct.
197, 198 (1960), lists among the factors which may be considered: long residence in a locality,
the ties of friends and family, the efficiency of modem police. Similar factors are mentioned
in McCoy v. United States, 34 U.S.L. WEEx 2383 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 1966) and Reeves v.
State, 411 P.2d 212 (Alaska 1966). Commentators feel that a consideration of these factors,
in addition to conferring the benefits of release on many who might not otherwise enjoy them,
will serve to prevent the contamination of youthful and first offenders by association with
hardened criminals. Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact on Criminology and the
Criminal Law Processes,43 TEx. L. Rav. 319, 325-26 (1965).
42 GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 35, at 157.
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III. Rights *ofthe Indigent Criminal Defendant During Trial
If an indigent does not have counsel at the trial stage of the criminal proceeding, he is denied the guidance necessary to make an effective presentation
of his case to those who have the power to deprive him of his life or liberty. The
inequality of status of the indigent defendant with those who have sufficient
funds to hire an attorney learned in the technicalities of criminal procedure is
apparent. It was early decided, in Johnson v. Zerbst, -"that the "Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel."" However, the constitution does not expressly guarantee the same right in a state criminal proceeding, and the Supreme Court decided four years after Johnson, in the case of Betts v. Brady," that this guarantee of the sixth amendment was not made binding on the states by the fourteenth.
The initial decisions subsequent to Betts holding that the right to counsel
was guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment turned on the particular circumstances of each case. Exemplary of such decisions is Powell v. Alabama." In
that case, seven ignorant and illiterate Negro youths were tried for the rape of
two white girls. The crime was one for which capital punishment could have been
imposed. The matter of counsel was disposed of in casual fashion by appointing
the entire bar to represent the defendants; none of the appointed counsel consulted with them prior to trial. In reversing the conviction, the Court decided
that,
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and
is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such

a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
7
aid in the preparation and trial of the case.Y
Later cases such as Cash v. Culver," and McNeal v. Culver," indicated that
this reasoning was not to be confined to capital cases. Determining whether
the absence of counsel was a violation of due process was a matter of investigating the mental capacity of the defendant and judging whether each case
contained "complex and intricate legal questions [which] were
the ken of a laymen.' "50

.

.

.

'beyond

However, such an approach failed to recognize that nearly every case contains legal questions, determinative of guilt or innocence, which are beyond the
ken of laymen possessing even superior intelligence. Very few laymen are
43 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

44 Id. at 463.
45 316 U.S. 455 (1942). However, the Court did add that lack of counsel in a particular
case could lead to a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness as to violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 473.
46 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
47 Id. at 71.
48 358 U.S. 633 (1959) (burglary prosecution).
49 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (prosecution for "Assault to Murder in the First Degree").
50 Id. at 116.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
equipped to know, present, and argue effectively the legal implications of questions such as the denial of due process resultant upon: comment by the court
or prosecution as to the defendant's failure to take the stand in his own behalf
as evidence of guilt;"' use of the fruit of testimony in a state (federal) prosecution of a witness, where such testimony was given under a grant of immunity
by the federal (state) government;52 compelling a criminal defendant to testify
against himself in a state court; 3 refusing a request for a change of venue when
the people of the locality have previously been exposed to the defendant's personal confession;5 4 admitting into evidence a confession which is the result of
the defendant's mind being overborne by the police;55 suppressing evidence
favorable to an accused after he has requested it;6 admitting into evidence a
confession which is the product of the administration of a "truth serum";" or
in admitting into evidence in a state court articles obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the federal constitution. 8
Recognition of the lack of capacity of the ordinary defendant to act effectively in such matters did come finally in Gideon v. Wainwright.5" In that case an
indigent defendant on trial in a state court for a noncapital felony was denied
his request for the appointment of counsel. Betts v. Brady" was reconsidered
and overruled on the ground that the right to counsel is such a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial, that it is made mandatory on the states by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court returned to the
reasoning in Powell and expanded the limited holding of that case. However,
two questions remain unanswered by the express language of Gideon: (1) Is
this a right which arises only upon request? (2) What degree of aid must be
furnished by counsel whom the state is now required to appoint?
As to the initial inquiry, dealing with the necessity of a request, the decision
in the pre-Gideon case of Carnley v. Cochran expressly stated that "where the
assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished
counsel does not depend on a request."'" If there is doubt as to the applicability
of this language to a Gideon situation, it is resolved by the Supreme Court's
decision in Doughty v. Maxwell.2 There a right to counsel case had been
remanded earlier to the Ohio courts for reconsideration in light of Gideon. Upon
remand, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the defendant had not been denied
the right to counsel because he had failed to make a request for an attorney
when he pleaded guilty to a rape charge.6" However, the United States Supreme
Court then reversed in a per curiam decision, simply citing Gideon and Carnley.
In answer to the second question posed above, regarding the type of assistance which must be rendered, the pertinent decisions are both old and new.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
Murphy v. Waterfront Comn'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
376 U.S. 202 (1964).
Doughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963).

NOTES.
The opinion in Powell initially spoke of appointed counsel giving "effective
aid.""' Later in Ferguson v. Georgia,5 the Court repeated that the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel and extended the effective
assistance standard to apply "in the case of an accused tried for a noncapital
offense, or represented by appointed counsel."6 "
The decisions in this area either simply state the rule of "effective assistance
of counsel" without explanation or give explanations of what is not effective
assistance. It is accepted that the judgment of ineffectiveness is not to be made
simply by hindsight.6 7 Representative of the statements as to what does not
constitute "effective assistance of counsel" is the language in Turner v. Maryland,68 that,
to establish a claim of inadequacy it is [not] necessary to show an extreme
situation of counsel treacherously conniving with the prosecutor to defraud
the client of his rights. Without this feature a trial may still be so lacking
in fundamental fairness as to constitute a denial of constitutional rights.69
The requirement is not satisfied if a court-designated lawyer makes a
merely perfunctory appearance and does nothing whatever before or during
the trial to advise his client or protect his rights. . . .Pro forma entry of
an appearance without study or preparation for useful participation7 0 in
the trial is not a satisfaction of the constitutional rights of an accused.
The requirement of "effective assistance of counsel" protects against any
attempt at pro forma compliance with the constitutional right of r~presentation.
However, while this standard aims to equalize status, there is no requirement
that a defendant be furnished with the best attorney possible or that he have
the unqualified right to select counsel he desires. 7 The constitutional mandate
is only that the indigent have the same benefits before the court and jury as
he would enjoy if he were financially able to hire a competent lawyer.
One of the important ramifications of Gideon is its effect on the application of recidivist or habitual criminal statutes. Because the presence or
absence of counsel is thought to go to the fundamental fairness of the trial, the
Gideon rule has been held to apply retrospectively. 2 Not only does such a retrospective application invalidate prior convictions, but since use of a multiple
offender statute depends on the existence of prior convictions, their invalidation
necessarily imparts illegality and unconstitutionality to add sentences imposed
64 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
65 365 U.S. 570 (1961). This case declared unconstitutional the provision of the Georgia
Criminal Code which prohibited the questioning of a defendant by his own attorney even if
he wished to testify in his own behalf, on the ground that the provision denied the defendant
effective assistance of counsel at a crucial point in the trial.
66 Id. at 596. State courts have followed the requirement of "effective assistance." See,
e.g., In re Shuttle, 214 A.2d 48 (Vt. 1965).
67 See, e.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978
(1963). Kilgore v. United States, 323 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
922 (1964), adds that the mere fact of conviction does not militate against the presumption
of competency which attends every complaint of inadequacy.
68 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962).

69 Id. at 510.

70 Id. at 511.
71 People v. Gray, 33 Ill.2d 349, 211 N.E.2d 369, 372 (1965).
72 Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). The Court in Linkletter notes that
Gideon itself was a retrospective application of the rule it announced since the defendant there
collaterally attacked the prior judgment by a post-conviction remedy. 381 U.S. at 628 n.13.
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under such statutes because their application rests upon these prior convictions."'
IV. Rights of the Indigent Criminal Defendant After Trial
The initial problem of the indigent defendant who has been convicted at
the trial is to bring his appeal before the proper court. A number of states, in
an effort to allay administrative expenses, and not as an intended discrimination
against indigent persons, provide that certain fees must be paid for the docketing of an appeal. Inability to comply with such statutes results in no appeal
for those without sufficient finances. The Supreme Court, in Burns v. Ohio, 4
decided that, under the fourteenth amendment, a state could not so limit the
right to invoke the jurisdiction of its appellate courts. The Court concluded
that such fee rquirements were based upon the irrational assumption that the
motion of an indigent was less meritorious than that of another defendant. 5
Subsequently in Smith v. Bennett, 6 it was held that the Burns decision extended
to post-conviction proceedings other than appeals because "to interpose any
financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws."'"
These cases are a recognition of the fundamental fact that the judicial
machinery is not infallible and that everyone should be granted an equal opportunity to partake of its corrective measures. Recognition of this same fundamental principle is found in analogous decisions of the Supreme Court to the
effect that in the federal judicial system a defendant should not be barred from
having his appeal heard when, acting alone, he fails to file a timely appeal
although he took all possible steps to do so"s as well as in decisions holding that
a defendant must be provided with counsel and a record of sufficient completeness in an attempt to challenge a district court's denial of his motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal. 9
Once a convicted defendant has been given access to the appellate system,
the basis of any reversal must be the discovery of error in the proceedings below.
Adequate discovery and presentation of trial errors can be made only when a
sufficient record of the proceedings is available for examination by appellant's
counsel. The burden of competent appellate tactics falls heavily on a defendant
who cannot afford to purchase an adequate trial record. The Supreme Court
0
recognized in Griffin v. Illinois,"
that the fourteenth amendment prohibits such
73 E.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Jones v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d
1 (4th Cir. 1963).
74 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
75 Id. at 257-58.
76 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
77 Id. at 709.
78 Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
79 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). This opinion also noted that a
liberal view has been taken of papers - such as an appeal bond in a district court, notice of
appeal given to prison officials for filing, and letters to a district court for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis - filed by indigent and incarcerated defendants, as equivalents of notices of
appeal to preserve jurisdiction in the courts of appeal. Id. at 442 n.5. For a comprehensive
treatment of the availability of post-conviction procedures after failure to file timely notice of
appeal, see Note, 41 NOTRE DAME
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73 (1965).

NOTES
inequality of opportunity at this stage of the criminal law enforcement process.
The ruling in Griffin is based on the conclusion that,
to deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them may lose
their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate
courts would set aside.... There can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have money enough to buy transcripts.81
Therefore, the state is required to supply without cost to the defendant, who
cannot afford it, a transcript or other sufficient record of the trial (such as a
bystander's bill of exception).
As noted in Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.," 2 this rule does not require
a transcript to be furnished whenever a criminal defendant seeks appellate
review; rather it requires that adequate appellate review be afforded to rich
and poor alike and this may be assured by various substitutes for a transcript.
Although Griffin expressly provides for substitutes the one afforded by the state
of Washington in Eskridge was declared to be inadequate."
There a state
statute allowed a trial judge to deny a petition for a free transcript if he was
of the opinion that justice would not be promoted by the granting of the transcript. This interposition of'a government official between an indigent and the
appellate courts was likewise the basis for the decision in Lane v. Brown,8 that
the Indiana system for supplying free trial records to indigents was unconstitutional. Under the Indiana procedure a public defender could obtain a free
transcript on appeal if he deemed the appeal to be meritorious. However, if
he concluded against the defendant, there was no provision whereby the latter
could obtain the record himself. The constitutional insufficiency of these two
systems lies in the fact that rather than granting a substitute for a transcript, as
was envisioned by the Court in Griffin, those states had provided a substitute
for full appellate review in the case of an indigent."
The requirements of Griffin and Eskridge are not that the state place the
indigent in the same stead as an affluent appellant. Thus, although financially
able defendants might waste money on the purchase of an entire transcript when
only a part is sufficient, the duty of the state is merely to furnish an adequate
record of those portions of the trial proceedings wherein the claimed errors
lie." As an incidental point, it might be noted here that if, as may often be the
case when a person convicted prior to Griffin now seeks a free trial record on
the basis of a retroactive application of that decision, it is presently impossible to
81 Id. at 19. The Court did acknowledge, as it did later in Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961), that the conclusion here applies only after a state has instituted an appellate system
and that establishment of such a process is not obligatory on the states. Id. at 18.
82 357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1958).
83 Id. at 216.
84 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963).
85 Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958).
86 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). This case declared unconstitutional, as
used in the instant situation, the Washington system - initiated after Eskridge - for granting
trial records to indigents. Again the critical factor was that an indigent was given an inadequate substitute for full appellate review.
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reconstruct an adequate record for appeal and the defendant had a lawyer for
purposes of an appeal which was not pursued, it has been held that the state
may with impunity deny him relief.87
Although a case arising in the federal criminal system, Hardy v. United
States,88 contains language which may indicate the probable resolution of the
question of whether it is ever necessary to grant an indigent an entire record
of the trial. In answer the Supreme Court states that the furnishing of a transcript relevant to the points of error assigned is the minimum which is required
and that where a defendant is represented by a different counsel on appeal, no
less than a full record suffices.88 It would seem that if the same situation were
presented in the context of a state criminal system, a decision that the entire
record is unnecessary in such a case would conflict with the reasoning in Eskridge
and Draperv. Washington" that the indigent may not be denied the full appellate
review available to the defendant with finances. No matter how complete a
transcript may be, if there is no one with sufficient training to discover errors,
it is for all practical purposes useless to the appellant. For this reason it was
1 that the fourteenth
decided in Douglas v. California"
amendment obligates the
states to appoint counsel for indigents in the first appeal which is granted to all
as a matter of right. The Court concluded that denial of counsel on the ground
that appointment would not be advantageous to the defendant or the court
was as invidious a discrimination against the poor as the practice condemned
in Griffin because,
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of
counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for
himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden,
has only the right
to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a mean82
ingful appeal.

This statement re-emphasizes the concepts which underlie the decision in Gideon
that counsel must be appointed for trial.
87 Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 870 (1963) (transcript
unavailable because of death of court reporter subsequent to 1941 conviction). The Court in
Linkletter noted that Eskridge provided for retroactive application inasmuch as that case dealt
with a conviction some twenty years before Griffin. 381 U.S. at 628 n.13. However, Mr.
Justice Goldberg, in dissent in Norvell, says that the Court tacitly approves a peculiar type of
retroactivity here in that the inquiry is to whether there is a deprivation of constitutional
rights when the defendant, convicted prior to Griffin now seeks a free transcript, rather than
to whether he was deprived of his constitutional rights when denied a transcript at the time of
his original conviction and appeal. 373 U.S. at 424-25. For a comprehensive treatment of the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on the retroactive application of various constitutionalcriminal law decisions, see Note 41, NoTRE DAmF. LAWYER 206 (1965).
88 375 U.S. 277, motion for modification of opinion denied, 376 U.S. 936 (1964).
89 Id. at 280. The Court expressly states, however, that its opinion involves only the
statutory scheme provided and does not reach constitutional requirements. Also controlling in
Hardy is the decision in Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
998 (1959), that the duty of counsel is not to serve as amicus to the court of appeals, but as an
advocate for the appellant and the duties of an advocate require full preparation which can
be made only with the aid of a full record. 375 U.S. at 281-82.
90 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
91 372 U.S. 353, rehearing denied, 373 U.S. 905 (1963).
92 Id. at 357-58.
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It must be recognized that the decision in Douglas limits the right to counsel to the initial appeal to which the defendant is entitled as a matter of right."3
Hence, while the decision comports with the reasoning of prior cases that equal
protection demands equal status of rich and poor alike, it leaves open an important question which hopefully will be answered conclusively by the Supreme
Court - is there a right to counsel in post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings despite the fact that they are civil in nature?94 A possible answer is
that the right to counsel does exist in the prosecution of an action for postconviction relief on the theory, as advanced in Hamilton v. Alabama, 5 that
although technically civil in nature, the post-conviction proceeding, by virtue
of the frequency of its use, has become an integral part of the criminal law
enforcement process and therefore that counsel must be appointed for an indigent undertaking such a remedy.9
V. Conclusion
The recent pronouncements of federal and state courts indicate an awareness that the ordinary layman is not equipped to defend his rights effectively
in the various phases of the criminal law enforcement process. While judicial
recognition of the right to counsel under the Constitution may be the answer
in the majority of cases, this approach offers no solution for the group of persons
who do not know enough to assert this right or who are financially incapable
of acquiring the services of competent legal counsel. The remedies of the courts
in such situations have been declarations that where such rights exist they must
be granted to rich and poor alike and that, if a person is unable to procure
such rights through his own resources, the government is obligated to aid him.
However, such decisions apparently are not a panacea for the ills of the indigent.
Conclusive answers are yet to be supplied to the important questions of whether
the right to counsel at the police interrogation arises only on request and whether
advice as to the existence of the right is necessary; whether the Constitution
requires release of a defendant on pre-trial bail if there are other factors to
assure presence at the trial when he is unable to meet the financial requisites of
bail; and whether post-conviction proceedings, though civil in nature, have
become so critical in criminal judicial process that defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel. Judging from the tenor of recent Supreme Court decisions,
it would appear that discovery of constitutional protectives for the indigent in
these areas is forthcoming upon presentation of the proper cases for adjudication.
Alvin J. McKenna
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94

Id. at 356; Martin v. State, 167 So. 2d 912, 915 (Ala. 1964).

This question has been answered in the negative by the lower federal and state courts:

e.g., Flowers v. Oklahoma, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2488 (10th Cir. March 1, 1966) (federal habeas
corpus proceeding); Noble v. Sigler, 244 F. Supp. 445 (D. Neb. 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1965) (state post-conviction proceedings); Summers v. Rhay, 410 P.2d 608 (Wash.
1966) (state habeas corpus proceeding).
95 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
96 Id. at 54. The critical nature of these proceedings is apparent from the fact that in the
recent major cases of Escobedo, Gideon and Douglas, later review after the "one and only
appeal as of right" resulted in reversals.

